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Confronting the ‘Fraud Bottleneck’: 
Private Sanctions for Fraud and their Implications for Justice 
Purpose of this paper 
 
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the ways in which 
contemporary organisations are imposing their own private 
sanctions on fraudsters. 
Design/methodology/ 
approach 
 
The research draws on primary data from interviews with counter 
fraud practitioners in the UK, secondary sources and case 
examples. 
Findings 
 
Such developments have been stimulated, at least in part, by the 
broader limitations of the criminal justice system and in particular 
a ‘fraud bottleneck’. Alongside criminal sanctions, many examples 
were provided of organisations employing private prosecutions 
innovative forms of civil sanction and ‘pseudo state’ sanctions, 
most commonly civil penalties comparable to fines. 
Research limitations/ 
implications 
 
Such changes could mark the beginning of the ‘rebirth of private 
prosecution’ and the further expansion of private punishment. 
Growing private involvement in state sanctions and the 
development of private sanctions represents a risk to traditional 
guarantees of justice. There are differences in which comparable 
frauds are dealt with by corporate bodies and thus considerable 
inconsistency in sanctions imposed. In contrast with criminal 
justice measures, there is no rehabilitative element to private 
sanctions. More research is needed to assess the extent of such 
measures, and establish what is happening, the wider social 
implications, and whether greater state regulation is needed. 
What is 
original/value of 
paper 
The findings are of relevance to criminal justice policy makers, 
academics and counter fraud practitioners in the public and 
private sectors. 
Key Words: Fraud, private sector, punishment, prosecution, sentencing, victims 
Article Type: Research paper 
Implications for practice: 
• Private sanctions for fraud are likely to continue to grow, as organisations pursue their 
own measures rather than relying on increasingly over-stretched criminal justice 
systems. 
• Their emergence, extent and implications are not fully understood by researchers and 
therefore need much more research, consideration and debate. 
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• These private measures need to be more actively recognised by criminal justice policy 
makers and analysts alongside the already substantial formal involvement of the private 
sector in punishment through prisons, electronic tagging and probation, for example. 
• Such measures lack the checks and balances, and greater degree of consistency as laid 
out in sentencing guidelines, of the criminal justice system. In light of this, consideration 
needs to be given to greater state regulation of private sanctions for fraud. 
• More also needs to be done to help fraudsters suffering problems such as debt or 
addiction to rebuild their lives. There is a strong case for measures beyond the criminal 
justice system to support such fraudsters to be created and publicly promoted. 
 
Introduction 
The emergence of ‘private policing’ has become a subject of great interest amongst policy-
makers, researchers and academics. A variety of issues have been explored, including the 
agents and bodies involved, their culture, their legal powers, their regulation and the social 
implications of their expansion (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983, 1987; South, 1988; 
Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader and Walker, 2001, 2007; Rigakos, 2002; 
Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Crawford, Lister and Blackburn, 2005; 
Button, 2007, 2011; Sarre and Prenzler, 2009; White, 2010). Empirical studies have shown 
the substantial contribution that the private sector makes to policing internationally in 
terms of numbers and roles (Shearing, Farnell and Stenning, 1980; Jones and Newburn, 
1998; Prenzler, Sarre and Earle, 2008; Confederation of European Security Services, 2011; 
Nalla and Wakefield, 2014). 
There has also been interest in the privatisation of policing (South, 1988; Johnston, 1992; 
Prenzler, 2004; Wakefield and Button, 2014) and punishment (James, Bottomley, Liebling 
and Clare, 1997; Sarre, 2001; Mehigan and Rowe, 2007; Shefer and Liebling, 2008; Genders, 
2013; Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2014; Ludlow, 2014, 2015). However, interest in the privatisation 
of punishment has tended to focus upon those areas of the state in which direct 
government policy has led to a transfer of function from the public to the private or 
voluntary sector, most commonly in relation to prisons, prisoner escort, custody suites and 
probation. Johnston (1992) associated such developments in UK public policy, many of 
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which have been mirrored internationally, with a ‘privatisation mentality’ that began under 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in the 1980s. These amount to what 
Johnston (1992) would have described as ‘direct load shedding’ and ‘contracting out’, 
whereby the state has deliberately shed roles to the private sector and moved other 
traditionally state services to private contractors. Such initiatives can also be linked to the 
concept within the governmentality literature of ‘responsibilization’, a process in which the 
state has ‘passed back’ governance roles that it had previously absorbed to the private and 
voluntary sectors, including policing and crime prevention functions (O’Malley, 1992; 
Garland, 1996, O’Malley, 2009).  
In The Rebirth of Private Policing, Johnston (1992) also describes a process of ‘indirect load 
shedding’, whereby the state, unable to meet public or corporate expectations, is gradually 
replaced by the private sector filling the gap. Such initiatives have been well documented 
with regard to areas of policing, such as the patrol of public streets, where the state has not 
supplied the presence expected. A number of UK studies have exemplified how the private 
sector (with varying degrees of support from state bodies) has been able to offer this service 
in residential areas, with the local communities willing to pay for that gap to be filled 
(McManus, 1995; Noaks, 2000; Sharp and Wilson, 2000; Crawford et al., 2005).  Discussion 
of such trends is developed from an Australian perspective by Prenzler (2004) and a North 
American viewpoint by Brodeur (2010). 
An area in which there has been less academic interest is the ‘indirect load shedding’ of 
punishment, although a number of studies have recognised this as occurring with respect to 
fraud and started to consider its implications. Some three decades ago, Levi (1987, p.183) 
described prosecution as the ‘control method of the last resort’ in relation to fraud cases in 
the UK, due to their complexity and expense. He went on to observe that cuts to police 
resources for the investigation of serious fraud, which was already being de-prioritised at 
that time in relation to other crimes, shifted ‘the economic burden of crime investigation 
onto victims, especially corporate victims … and has thus transferred public law back into 
the sphere of private law’ (p.282). Levi, and later Doig and Macaulay (2008), detailed some 
of the ways in which UK public sector agencies address fraud without involving the police, 
with the active encouragement of the Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) 
and the National Audit Office (NAO), by means of their own investigations and criminal 
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prosecutions as well as other forms of sanction. Sarre (2001) considered the implications of 
using civil and administrative sanctions, as opposed to the criminal law, in relation to a 
number of areas of criminality, but particularly corporate crime and fraud. The advantages 
that he noted included efficiency and cost effectiveness, while he also highlighted 
disadvantages associated with fewer rights for defendants, greater inconsistency in their 
application, lower visibility and lack of deterrence. 
This paper contributes to this small but important body of literature by looking more closely 
at corporate responses to the punishment of fraud across the private, public and voluntary 
sectors, and building on Sarre’s work to consider the social implications of these responses. 
Drawing on recent empirical research and legal cases, it will show how the inability of the 
state to provide for effective criminal sanctions, combined with the desire of many private 
organisations for a different approach to punishment, is fuelling a growing private 
involvement in the pursuit and delivery of sanctions. Its extent is such that the corporate 
sector could be said to be developing a private sanctions framework beyond the state 
infrastructure. The state has been largely agnostic to such initiatives so far in relation to the 
private sector, and as such they cannot be viewed as a form of ‘responsibilization’ – where 
state encouragement is required. However, they might be viewed as a form of ‘self-
responsibilization’ (a concept that has already been raised in a limited way by Yesil, 2006, 
vis-à-vis video surveillance), whereby organisations are reclaiming responsibility from the 
state when it no longer supports their needs and deciding to take responsibility for 
punishment themselves. Such conditions are not new, as prior to the formation of the 
modern police in 1829 (and for some time afterwards), private prosecution was the norm 
amongst private entities (Johnston, 1992). The initiatives to be described in this paper may, 
therefore, represent the ‘rebirth of private prosecution’, and prosecution in a much broader 
sense of criminal, civil and private sanctions. This represents an additional dimension to the 
already substantial and growing involvement in private punishment through prisons, tagging 
and probation.  
This paper will illustrate this ‘self-responsibilization’ or ‘indirect load shedding’ of 
punishment in relation to fraud. It will outline the methodology and then present the 
findings, starting by examining corporate victims in context, before illustrating the macro 
conditions and in particular the ‘fraud bottleneck’ that have stimulated such developments. 
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The paper will then outline some of the initiatives that organisations are pursuing in order 
to fill the gap in their punishment needs. In the conclusion the paper will discuss some of 
the broader implications of these changes, building on the considerations highlighted by 
Sarre (2001).  
Methodology 
This paper draws on the data from a wider research project looking at organisational 
responses to fraud which involved 39 semi-structured interviews (including five conducted 
over the telephone). The participants (listed in Figure 1) were practitioners from a variety of 
public, private and voluntary bodies, from junior to senior, and with some form of counter 
fraud role. Some of the sectors that were represented included banking, retailing, insurance, 
building supplies, local government, the National Health Service (NHS), a public transport 
authority and trade associations. The interviews were also targeted at bodies providing 
services to organisations to deal with fraud such as the police, Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS), firms of accountants, lawyers and a private investigator. Some of the telephone 
interviews related to bodies involved in the investigation and prosecution of healthcare 
fraud in the United States, where it had been suggested there was innovative use of 
sanctions. 
All five authors undertook interviews with reference to an interview schedule based around 
a standard set of topics. Among these, participants were asked about their experience of the 
following, in each case with reference to a common set of prompts: 
• Criminal prosecution with official body (CPS, SFO, SOLP) 
• Criminal private prosecution  
• Civil litigation  
• Staff disciplinary procedures 
• Use of official regulatory body where possible 
• Parallel sanctions  
• Other examples of sanctions: UK or overseas 
One of the themes that emerged from the research was the diverse and growing range of 
private sector sanctions deployed to deal with fraud in the absence of an adequate state 
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response. This paper draws upon interview data, documentary material secured during the 
project and legal cases, as well as other secondary data.    
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Findings 
Corporate Victims in Context 
Over the last two decades there has been a substantial increase in research on victims of 
crime and an increasing pre-occupation with their needs among policy-makers (Walklate, 
2007a, 2007b). This has been accompanied by a growing punitive orientation among the 
public and political elites in many Western countries (Garland, 2001; Roberts, Stalans, 
Indemaur and Hough, 2003). On the other hand, organisations as victims, whether in the 
public, private or voluntary sectors, have been largely neglected by researchers.  Rather, 
under the auspices of ‘white collar crime’, the focus has invariably been upon the corporate 
body as the offender, rather than the victim (Braithwaite, 1984; Croall, 2007; Whyte, 2007; 
Snell and Tombs, 2011). While there can be little doubt that there is extensive criminal 
behaviour by corporate bodies, which in most jurisdictions does not receive the attention it 
deserves, organisations are victims of crime too. 
One of the most common crimes they experience is fraud by employees, suppliers, 
customers and the general population (Levi, 2008). Indeed, in monetary terms it is one of 
the most – if not the most – expensive crimes to society. In an international survey by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2014), it was estimated that a typical organization 
loses five per cent of its annual revenue each year to fraud. The average value of a fraud 
was $145,000, while just over a fifth of cases involved losses of at least $1 million, and the 
projected global annual fraud loss was nearly $3.7 trillion. In the UK the National Fraud 
Indicator showed a £52 billion estimated loss in 2012, of which the vast majority can be 
attributed to private and public organisations (National Fraud Authority, 2013). 
Research exploring the sanctions that organisations use when targeted has, however, been 
limited (see Levi, 1987; 1992; 2002; Bussmann and Werle, 2006). One of the few studies 
that provides clues on a global scale is a somewhat dated international survey of 5,500 
companies by Bussmann and Werle (2006). They found that only 51 per cent of cases (both 
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internal and external) led to a criminal charge. Distinct differences were also noted between 
regions, with Asian companies being much less likely to bring criminal charges (only 26 per 
cent) or terminate employment (68 per cent), and other measures, such as redeployment 
and warning and indeed doing nothing (16 per cent), being common options.  
There has also been a small body of research looking at corporate bodies as forms of 
governance, examining their internal systems for dealing with deviance, although this has 
been much broader than fraud and crime more generally (see  Shearing and Stenning, 1982; 
Macauley, 1986; Ayers and Braithwaite, 1995; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). There has, 
however, been little interest in some of the innovative and most importantly private ways in 
which corporate bodies are now developing to deal with fraud (as well as some other types 
of problems). The matter of fraud provides an ideal case study for examining some of these 
changes. First, it is a major problem to corporate bodies usually in cost and volume of 
offences (National Fraud Authority, 2013). Second, it is an area in which state resources are 
thin and, as a consequence, there have been a variety of private initiatives to fill the gap 
emerging. Before we start to examine these, the methods for this project will be outlined.  
The Fraud ‘Bottleneck’ in the Criminal Justice System 
Fraud is a major problem to the UK economy, with £20.2 billion of the £52 billion cost 
attributed to the private sector (National Fraud Authority, 2013). Millions of cases of fraud 
every year are perpetrated against the corporate sector. Many of these are undetected, but 
there are still many cases that are detected. When frauds are discovered by corporate 
bodies, it is notable that the range of responses employed extends well beyond those of the 
criminal justice system. With many internal frauds, the embarrassment and bad publicity 
that the criminal justice system could potentially bring are one reason why public 
prosecution may not be sought. Criminal trials often invite media interest and internal 
frauds often expose poor practices, such as staff incompetence or transgression, and poor 
supervision. However, even if a corporate body does want to pursue a criminal prosecution, 
there are a variety of factors that create a ‘bottleneck’, making it difficult for them to 
achieve that aim. 
The police in general devote few resources to fraud and there are less than 700 specialist 
fraud police officers in the whole of the UK (Button, Blackbourn and Tunley, 2014). This fact, 
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and the lack of political will that lies behind it, can be put into context when one considers 
the 3000+ counter fraud specialists employed by the UK’s Department for Work and 
Pensions to address the specific problem of benefit fraud (Button et al., 2014). For many 
organisations – particularly small and medium sized enterprises – they simply do not have 
the capacity to launch a criminal investigation (whether it is staff with the skills or resources 
to hire external investigators). This means that they rely on police interest which, given their 
resources, is often hard to secure (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2012). Even if an organisation does 
have the capacity to investigate to a criminal standard, it still requires the support of the 
police (or other state investigative body) for the case to be accepted and passed on to the 
prosecutors. Police interest may also be required in order to secure access to their powers 
of arrest and search. As such, the police represent the gatekeepers to the criminal justice 
system, but because of the resources and attitudes of some, it is often difficult to obtain 
their interest, as the quote from one interview illustrates:  
(in) this day and age, and I worked in London, and you try and report something to 
the police and you say, "I've had £4,000 nicked." And they say, "Yeah, what do you 
want me to do about it then?" "Well you're the police ain't you?" "£4,000, take it on 
the chin mate." Building Society Fraud Investigator (Head of Department). 
In another interview the long road to justice in some cases that do secure interest was 
illustrated:  
I had another case, it was a middle manager. Daft at it seems, he was using petty 
cash to pay his lifestyle, pay wages of non-existent employees and that sort of thing. 
The point was the company was in the Midlands, the manager had a branch in Exeter 
or something. He had to go to the local police and they didn't have a fraud squad 
and the guy in Exeter was an operational detective and he took on the fraud, but it 
took him six months, nine months to get round to it because every time he came on 
duty there was work to do here, work to do there on something else, there was a 
rape or a murder or a robbery or whatever. So although that guy was willing, keen 
and able he didn't have the opportunity to be able to do it. Private Investigator. 
The position of the police was summed up by one Detective Sergeant from an Economic 
Crime Team:  
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[the Economic Crime Team] it’s almost like the sickly child, you know, 
undernourished and under resourced by comparison with more high profile 
departments.  So, you have an issue, there, where demand … resourcing does not 
match potential demand, so … I don’t think there is that confidence with the current 
resourcing that we can adequately … we do secure many very, very good 
convictions, but there is that continuing unease ... Police Detective Region 2.  
The police, however, are but the first part of the bottleneck. The next is the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS). Some corporate bodies who secure police interest have the case 
referred to the CPS, who then decide not to continue with the case. Some private bodies 
have even gone direct to the CPS, as one interviewee who was a CPS lawyer noted:  
Occasionally, people will come to us direct and we always explain the difference 
between the role of the investigator, the role of the prosecutor and refer them back 
to the police and, usually, they’ve been to the police already and they’re coming to 
us because they haven’t had any joy there. CPS Lawyer Local. 
Unlike many state bodies (such as the Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and 
Customs and the NHS) which have developed extensive criminal investigation resources and 
capacity for their own prosecutions or sections within the CPS, private bodies do not have 
these luxuries (Button, 2011). There is therefore a ‘gap’ that has emerged between the 
demand for criminal sanctions and the capacity of the police to supply these. In such a 
vacuum, corporate bodies have been developing a variety of mechanisms to sanction 
fraudsters. In the private sector, however, there is also the strong influence of financial 
matters, as one consultant providing services to both noted:  
Speed of response, corporates want things doing absolutely immediately because 
the bottom line matters more in corporates. In the public sector they are very keen 
to see justice done so they would prefer to see somebody put in prison and forget 
the money has actually gone somewhere and they don’t need the money, whereas 
corporates couldn't give a toss what happened to the person, prison or not prison 
and would actually prefer not to because of the reputational damage. They are far 
more interested in, the first question is, "Can you get my money back?" Counter 
Fraud Consultant 2.  
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Numerous studies have noted the variety of employer imposed sanctions used by corporate 
bodies, including reprimand, taking away privileges, reduced pay through a variety of 
measures, and dismissal (Macauley, 1986; Goldstraw-White, 2012; Meerts, 2014; Weiss, 
2014). These are not controversial. However, as this paper will show, for some corporate 
bodies these, combined with the absence of a state response, have not satisfied their desire 
for an effective sanction. As a consequence, a variety of private prosecution and private 
sanctions have emerged on top of these traditional sanctions, which will now be explored.  
Filling the Gap 
Many private sector bodies have been finding new means to sanction fraudsters, some of 
which use state structures, while others employ new privately developed structures. It is 
important to note that generalisation is difficult as the use of such measures varies 
considerably within the private sector. 
Criminal sanctions remain attractive to many private organisations, providing the ultimate 
deterrent to other potential fraudsters. Initiating criminal proceedings can also bring the 
perpetrator to the negotiating table (Williams, 2014), as one interviewee noted:  
The Chief Exec had suspected that the Finance Director was messing about with the 
funds. He did not know what was happening but he knew there was a big hole in the 
accounts. That was as much as he knew, so we sent in one of our investigators and 
one of our forensic accountants when he wasn't in, on a Friday…. It was such an easy 
one to spot because we just went straight into his internet activity and he was doing 
online bingo, constantly. I mean a bloke, online bingo. He spent over £700,000 of the 
company's money on online bingo at work. By the Sunday afternoon we had actually 
got his house signed over. We had gone round to see him and basically said, "This is 
ugly, could go to the police." And he just said, "OK" and literally signed over his 
house to the company. Counter Fraud Consultant 2. 
However, it is also clear that among some sections of commerce there is an appetite for 
new measures in the knowledge that the traditional state centred approach cannot satisfy 
their needs. As one investigator from the financial services sector succinctly summed up:  
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We've got to the point where we have given up with the police. Building Society 
Fraud Investigator (Head of Department). 
Some organisations have therefore sought to develop their own means to guarantee that 
criminal prosecution is on the negotiating table, most notably through private prosecution.  
 
Private prosecutions  
The right to pursue a private prosecution in England and Wales is set out in section 6 of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (see Lewis, Brooks, Button, Shepherd and Wakefield, 
2014, in relation to fraud). There is evidence of growing interest and use of private 
prosecution. There has been media coverage exposing the willingness of companies such as 
Virgin Media to pursue private prosecutions and high profile cases such as  the conviction of 
Kenyan businessman Ketan Somaia for a $19.5 million fraud by private prosecution in 2014  
(Dodd, 2014; Croft, 2014). There are also law firms that have emerged offering this service, 
such as Edward Hayes and one firm, Edmunds Marshall McMahon, specialising purely in 
private prosecutions for corporate victims (Edmunds Marshall McMahon, 2015). Ernst and 
Young, one of the major accountancy firms, has also launched a private prosecution service 
for clients in 2014 in partnership with Peters and Peters Solicitors (Croft and Binham, 2014). 
Some corporate victims have turned to firms such as these when there has been police 
interest, but the CPS has declined to prosecute. For example, two interviewees from two 
different anti-piracy bodies both claimed the CPS had been reluctant to take forward some 
cases of copyright infringement related crimes, but corporate willingness to fund a private 
prosecution had encouraged the police to remain involved when possible CPS non-
involvement may have reduced their commitment to remain involved. In other cases the 
organisation had been determined to secure what they regarded as a far more effective 
sanction despite the lack of CPS interest. The case of one anti-piracy unit head who used a 
private prosecution illustrates this:  
… and all that happened, every time they got served with some civil letters, they 
folded, moved off and set up a new company in a false name. So they were spending 
a fortune constantly trying to redo it, and send people after them. And one of them 
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got chatting to me, and I said, 'why don't we just go criminally?' It's absolutely a clear 
criminal case; let's just arrest them for conspiracy to defraud. So again, engaged with 
local law enforcement, they were arrested for that, convicted at court and also with 
the Proceeds of Crime [Act], so double whammy. I think he got three years or three 
and a half years, so a substantial sentence. Anti-Piracy Unit 3 Head.  
It is difficult to determine the extent of private prosecutions in England and Wales, because 
no statistics are kept by the CPS. Given that Edmunds Marshall McMahon was only 
established in 2012, there have not been significant numbers prior to this, but the formation 
of such firms and other significant entrances to the market illustrates that this is an area 
that may begin to grow. However, it is clear that private prosecution is growing as an option 
amongst corporate bodies.  
The privatisation of prosecution raises some interesting issues for debate. The constitutional 
division between the prosecutor and investigator in criminal cases is much cherished. This 
becomes blurred when the client becomes the paymaster for both. There is of course the 
right of the state to take over a private prosecution and discontinue it, which happened to 
Edmunds Marshall McMahon on one occasion (Edmonds and McMahon, 2014). However, if 
such cases expand, it remains to be seen how adequate such measures will be and whether 
the CPS will be able to cope if there are large numbers of private prosecutions occurring.  
 
Innovative civil sanctions  
The use of the civil justice system by corporate victims is another important tool, which 
provides for an option in parallel to criminal proceedings or quite often alone (Meerts and 
Dorn, 2009; Meerts, 2014). The lawyers specialising in civil fraud interviewed for this 
research all noted that many corporate bodies will use the civil process to secure 
recompense and compensation from the perpetrator, particularly when they hold assets 
such as property, investments or a pension fund. Cases pursued through the civil courts also 
enable a wide range of orders to be granted which can act as sanctions (such as freezing a 
bank account or confiscating a passport) and powers for the purposes of an investigation 
(such as searches). The way statistics are compiled by the Ministry of Justice means exact 
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figures are impossible to secure. It is clear that there are thousands of such cases every 
year, most settled out of court, and that this is still a significant and especially common 
private sanction open to corporate victims to pursue for large fraud losses.  
Some corporate bodies also pursue regulatory sanctions against fraudsters. Fraudsters who 
work in roles where they  require an official licence to operate, such as accountants, lawyers 
and surveyors, are often pursued through their regulatory bodies with the aim of having 
them ‘struck off’ as a means of sanction, which also serves as a tactic to bring the culprit to 
the negotiating table. The extent of such sanctions, however, is difficult to determine. 
One area of the civil law that has been utilised very innovatively by some insurance 
company victims relates to contempt of court (Button and Brooks, 2014). There are two 
categories of contempt of court, criminal and civil. The criminal form is concerned with 
direct contempt of court involving, for example, interrupting Crown Court proceedings, 
threatening witnesses or disobeying court orders. Civil contempt is usually concerned with 
the failure to comply with court orders and is a means to enforce remedies such as 
injunctions or compensation orders. The civil form is quasi-criminal in nature as the penalty 
is up to two years’ imprisonment and the burden of proof is to the criminal standard, 
beyond reasonable doubt. An unusual feature of the offence is that it is not tried before a 
jury. 
A particular species of civil contempt has been gaining momentum over the last few years in 
dealing with insurance fraud. The Civil Procedure Rule 32.14 provides that: 
Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or 
causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth 
without an honest belief in its truth (Ministry of Justice, 2015). 
The landmark case sparking this tool for insurers was Joanne Kirk v Carol Walton [2008] 
EWHC 1780 and [2009] EWHC 703 (QB). In this case, Joanne Kirk claimed that an accident in 
which her car experienced a rear end shunt had triggered health complaints leading to the 
inability to walk more than ten yards, and caused her to have to give up work. She initially 
claimed for £800,000 but eventually settled for £25,000 compensation, which she received. 
The insurers in this case, RBS, commissioned private investigators to put Kirk under 
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surveillance and secured footage of her walking, shopping and driving. As a result, they 
sought grounds to bring contempt proceedings against her for ‘making false statements’. 
The case was heard in March 2009 and she was found in contempt on two grounds of lying 
in court documents. Her penalty was to pay for her legal bill of £125,000, half the 
defendant’s legal costs and a £2500 fine (Guildhall Chambers, 2015).     
In another case, Nield v Loveday [2011] EWHC 2324, Acromas Insurance used the contempt 
of court route. A couple had sought to claim substantial personal injury damages for a car 
accident. The claim was shown to be fraudulent and Acromas, through the law firm Keoghs, 
brought successful contempt of court proceedings leading to a nine month prison sentence 
for the husband and six months suspended for 18 months for the wife (Keoghs, 2011). It is 
very difficult to estimate the total number of these types of case, as there are no clear 
statistics published and not all cases may be reported by the media. However, it is clear that 
this is becoming a service actively promoted by some firms, as the following extract from an 
article by a Director at solicitors DWF reveals:    
 As well as providing a remedy for fabricated incidents … contempt proceedings are 
an ideal remedy for exaggerated claims, which currently fall outside the acceptance 
criteria for IFED [Insurance Fraud Enforcement Bureau], the specialist police unit 
dedicated to tackling insurance fraud.  
It goes on to state,  
The days when dishonest claimants who are found out can simply walk away from 
their actions are over.  Procedures are in place to enable fraudsters to be punished 
and our experienced specialists are ready to use them. Delay is the enemy in this 
jurisdiction. The process is quick and relatively inexpensive and it is difficult to 
imagine a more potent counter fraud message to send fraudsters than they risk 
losing their freedom. (Palmer, 2012) 
It is difficult to determine the extent of this sanction because the Ministry of Justice does 
not keep statistics linked to this species of contempt. However, searches through the media 
coverage of insurers and lawyers would suggest that there have been dozens of cases since 
the Kirk case. The small number might lead one to consider it as not being significant. 
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However, the development of this sanction poses some interesting issues for debate. It 
provides for the potential for serious criminal-like penalties without some of the 
fundamental guarantees of criminal courts, such as trial by jury.  As with private 
prosecution, the divisions between investigation and prosecution that occur in the criminal 
arena also become blurred in contempt cases. Insurers effectively assume both roles, as the 
clients with the resources and ability to task their legal and investigation teams to pursue 
proceedings.  Unlike private prosecutions, however, there is no scope for the state to take 
over cases to discontinue them.   
 
‘Pseudo state’ sanctions  
The sanctions gap has also created the development of what could be described as ‘pseudo 
state’ sanctions since they are comparable to some state sanctions. The most common are 
civil penalties which compare to fines. Civil penalties have become particularly popular in 
the retail sector for shoplifting as well as some fraud related offences (Bamfield, 2012; 
Citizen Advice, 2009). Under these schemes, instead of an offender being pursued in the 
criminal courts, culprits are issued with a letter seeking compensation for the goods stolen 
and time taken by the organisation to investigate the matter. Another area in which such 
approaches have been used is against those suspected of downloading music illegally. The 
law firm ACS: Law secured much publicity when, on behalf of MediaCAT, it began issuing 
thousands of civil penalty letters to individuals suspected of downloading music illegally, 
demanding £500 or the prospect of court action (Wakefield, 2011). Many of those receiving 
letters claimed to be innocent and the firm eventually stopped doing this, while the 
managing partner of the firm faced disciplinary action from the Solicitors Regulatory 
Authority. There has also been criticism of those using these measures for demanding 
payments well in excess of the actual loss, as well as for targeting minors (Citizen Advice, 
2009).  
There are a variety of fraudster databases that could be compared to the UK’s state run 
Violent and Sex Offender Register, but which are managed by private sector consortiums. 
They are often marketed as ‘preventative tools’ rather than punishment, but they do have 
implications for individuals listed on the register, as has been noted in research on more 
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illicit blacklists (Whyte, 2015). The consequences of being placed on these fraudster lists 
include greater difficulties in securing employment and/or costs in gaining financial 
products, and therefore must be seen as a form of punishment. For example, an individual 
placed upon the Insurance Fraud Register might find it difficult to secure motor insurance or 
the costs may become prohibitive, making lawful driving impossible for many.  There are a 
number of bodies holding databases with details of individuals convicted of, dismissed from 
employment for, or suspected of fraud, some of the most prominent of which are listed in 
Figure 1. These vary in their coverage and the criteria for individuals included upon them. 
For example, the Staff Fraud Database maintained by CIFAS (a membership association for 
fraud prevention, formerly known as the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance Service) has the 
following criteria for inclusion on its database:  
Factual Accuracy and Standard of Proof 
In order to file a staff fraud record, the information must be factually correct and 
accurate. A member filing such information can only do so if it has good reason to 
believe it has or could have suffered loss, and/or it reasonably believes that it has 
grounds to press criminal charges for fraud or the commission of any other offence if 
a suspect were traced. This means that in all cases, members MUST be prepared to 
make a formal complaint to the police or other relevant law enforcement agency. 
Members must have carried out checks of sufficient depth to satisfy this standard of 
proof (and must retain a record of the checks). The criminal offence must be 
identifiable (Personal Communication from CIFAS). 
In general, the administrators of these schemes argue that they are fraud prevention tools, 
enabling their corporate users to prevent ‘known fraudsters’ gaining employment or access 
to their services. They do, however, have consequences for those registered on such 
databases, who may find it more difficult to access services such as credit, financial products 
or insurance, or secure a job.  Indeed, the Insurance Fraud Register has been upfront about 
the sanctions element to the scheme, noting in its launch statement:  
It is up to each individual insurer to decide how the information on the register is 
used; there is no common approach agreed across the industry; each insurer is at 
liberty to adopt its own approach. Insurers may wish to apply special terms to 
Page 16 of 30Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17 
 
proven fraudsters, decline to accept them as new customers or decline to invite 
renewal of a product. Proven insurance fraudsters will find it harder to buy new 
products and to renew their existing products. They may also find it more difficult to 
obtain other financial services, including loans and mortgages (Out-Law.Com, 2012).  
Little is known about the quality of the decision-making and the potential to review 
decisions which are wrong.  Most would regard the inclusion of those who have been 
convicted of fraud in court as uncontentious, but the vast majority of these entries are 
decided by the member organisation with no reference to an official court decision. The 
question can also be raised as to what happens when someone makes a genuine mistake or 
omits information in the rush of a credit application and, as a consequence, is added to one 
of these databases based upon the decision of the corporate body with no opportunity for 
the ‘fraudster’ to challenge the decision. Indeed, in 2014 a case was highlighted of a man 
who failed to notify his mortgage lender that he was letting some of his spare rooms and, as 
a consequence, was placed on the CIFAS fraudster database on the grounds of ‘application 
fraud and mortgage property misuse’ (Mikhailova, 2014).  
In another case in 2012 the BBC’s Money Box programme highlighted the case of a student 
who had been placed on the CIFAS fraudster database for ‘first party fraud’ by mistake, and 
who as a consequence had his existing bank accounts closed and was unable to open 
another account. The student complained, ‘I was made to go to the counter and clear my 
account in cash. You feel like a criminal when you're marched over and marched out the 
door without being given any reason as to why your account is being closed’ (BBC News, 
2012). Only his father’s intervention and investigation skills saved him as he was able to 
prove it was the bank’s mistake. The Chair of the then Financial Services Authority’s 
Consumer Panel, commented upon the case, ‘You cannot find out what you're accused of, 
you cannot plead your case and you find yourself unable to open a bank account and 
nothing can be done about it. What's happening goes absolutely against the rules of natural 
justice’ (BBC News, 2012). 
The implications for an individual in their access to a range of services, securing a job and 
the plain label of ‘fraudster’ could be significant. In short, the definitions of a fraudster and 
determining who is labelled as such are becoming privatised and fragmented with corporate 
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bodies determining the definitions and decisions with no reference to the state. There are a 
variety of definitions of what constitutes fraud, different levels of proof and multiple bodies 
presiding over the decisions. The consequence is a corporate sector that, in effect, has 
created its own system for determining and sanctioning fraudsters, operating on a mass 
scale. As Figure 2 illustrates, some of these databases contain hundreds of thousands of 
entries. Such measures may also represent a form of shaming in a manner that brings 
stigma rather than being ultimately re-integrative, as Braithwaite (1989) viewed the process 
of criminal sanction.   
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion  
 [There was] little or no attempt at criminal detection. Crime was brought to the 
courts when victims prosecuted offenders. Officials did not go out to find it. Justices 
dealt with the evidence, but detection and apprehension was left to the victims, who 
often went to great lengths to regain stolen property … (Johnston, 1992: 9). 
The quote by Johnston above refers to the policing and justice system of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. Those comments could also be applied to many of the 
arrangements in the private sector for dealing with fraud today. The emergence of private 
sector interventions to fill the gap and develop new private solutions amounts to the 
‘indirect load shedding’ of the state or ‘self-responsibilization’ of punishment. To adapt the 
title of Johnston’s book, we could be experiencing the ‘rebirth of private prosecution’ and 
further expansion of private punishment, added to the already substantial involvement of 
the private sector in punishment through prisons, tagging, probation, etc. In the UK, many 
of these changes have only recently occurred. The first contempt of court case for insurance 
fraud was in 2008, the specialist legal practice Edmunds Marshall McMahon was established 
in 2012, and the National Fraud Register in 2012; other initiatives such as the CIFAS Staff 
Fraud Database date back to 1988. As such the life of such measures may be limited; 
because they are so new they may not sustain enough support for them to continue. 
However, given that the underpinning conditions that have caused them are unlikely to go 
away, it seems likely they will continue to grow in the UK, and that this trend could well be 
replicated in other jurisdictions. Their emergence and implications are not fully understood 
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by researchers and therefore need much more consideration and debate, building on 
Sarre’s (2001) earlier work relating to civil and administrative responses to crimes more 
generally. 
First of all, as Sarre highlighted, the growing range of private involvement in state sanctions 
and the development of private sanctions represent a risk to the traditional guarantees of 
justice. The blurring of investigatory and prosecution decisions under the client’s purse with 
respect to private prosecution and contempt of court measures present a significant risk. 
Justice comes much more under commercial influence and away from an independent 
system built upon separation of powers. The proliferation of private pseudo justice beyond 
the criminal justice system also does not provide for the same checks and balances. At the 
pinnacle is the criminal justice system, with its extensive procedures, standards and 
balanced legal representation, set against a cacophony of other forums or in many cases 
just a decision-maker to determine guilt with very mixed standards of justice. Even the civil 
justice system does not guarantee legal representation for the accused. Some of the other 
sanctions, such as fraudsters’ databases, could be considered as the summary justice of the 
corporate state with little support available to help the defendant. For example, if an 
employee is sacked for a fraud that they dispute and is placed on a fraudster’s register, 
there is no guarantee of support for the accused to defend or challenge such decisions, 
when such a person might be incapable of defending themselves or have no opportunity to 
do so. Inclusion on such lists for many will have significant implications for their lives.   
The changes also highlight the clear differences in which comparable frauds are dealt with 
by corporate bodies and the consequent inconsistency in sanctions imposed, a problem also 
recognised by Sarre (2001) with respect to civil and administrative sanctions. Some 
comparable fraudsters may face a significantly different range of sanctions, with some 
facing the traditional criminal justice system, others the civil and pseudo measures and 
others presented with all of these. Consistency in sentencing in the criminal courts has been 
a subject of much debate and reform (Ashworth, 2007; Van Slyke and Bales, 2012). 
However, given the small number of fraud cases that ultimately end up in the criminal 
courts, such initiatives to create sentencing consistency seem futile when so many other 
sanctions are happening around them with no attempt to obtain consistency.  
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Another important implication of the use of non-criminal sanctions is that it signals the 
rejection of rehabilitation. There is much to be debated concerning the commitment and 
effectiveness of such measures within the criminal justice system (Zedner, 2004). But what 
is clear with the use of many of the sanctions described in this paper is the complete 
absence of any interest in rehabilitation. Fraudsters who may have significant personal 
problems that led them to commit fraud are likely to receive no help if they are dealt with 
outside the criminal justice system. Although many such fraudsters may be at low risk of 
reoffending, the rise of the non-criminal infrastructure, built upon situational principles of 
protecting the organisation, not society, does not provide for any rehabilitation. More needs 
to be done to focus on measures to help fraudsters suffering problems such as debt or 
addiction to rebuild their lives. Measures to help such fraudsters need to be created beyond 
the criminal justice system and publicly promoted.   
The ‘rebirth of private prosecution’ and the growing addition to the already growing private 
punishment infrastructure, occurring with the ‘self-responsibilization’ of punishment, have 
significant consequences that raise a wide range of issues for debate. It particularly requires 
more research to assess the extent of such measures (on which, as has been noted in this 
article, there is not much data at present), establish what is happening, their wider 
implications for society and, most importantly, whether greater state regulation of them 
needs to occur.  
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Figure 1. Interviewees (with assigned name used) contacted for this research 
Criminal Justice System 
Crown Prosecution Service national 
Crown Prosecution Service local  
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) representative 
Police detective region 1 
Police detective region 2 
Police detective London 
Police detective London 
 
Civil System  
Lawyer specialising in fraud 
Lawyer 2 Bevan Brittan (specifically asked for firm to be named)  
Lawyer 3 Bevan Brittan (specifically asked for firm to be named) 
 
Counter Fraud Bodies 
National Fraud Authority Official  
Anti-fraud NGO chair 
Fraud NGO official 
 
Public Sector  
Public corporation security manager 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills investigator 
NHS counter fraud specialist 
London Borough counter fraud specialist 
Regional local authority counter fraud specialist 
Trading standards officer  
Transport body security manager 
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Private Sector  
Counter fraud consultant 1 
Counter fraud consultant 2 
Private investigator (ex-fraud police) 
Building society fraud investigator (ex-fraud police) 
Building supplies manager (business controls and procedures manager) 
Company head (self-investigator) 
High street bank fraud investigator.  
Supermarket head of security 
Media company investigations manager  
 
Other Sectors 
RSPCA prosecutor  
Anti-piracy unit 1 director general 
Anti-piracy unit 2 acting head  
Anti-piracy unit 3 head   
Parking association  
Parking enforcement company 
Retail civil recovery expert 
 
USA  
US federal fraud investigator 
US federal prosecutor east coast  
US federal prosecutor deep south 
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Figure 2. Fraudster databases  
Staff Fraud Databases  
CIFAS Staff Fraud Database  
Contains around 1000 names of individuals who have been convicted of fraud or equivalent 
(see above) who are added by members. Members, over which there are over 160, have 
access to this database and can make entries. This database is largely orientated around 
financial services.  
Telecommunications UK Fraud forum (TUFF) Information on Ex-Employees Database  
A database covering details of staff of member organisations who have been dismissed for 
theft or fraud.  
Fraud Databases  
CIFAS National Fraud Database  
This is a much larger database containing information relating to confirmed and attempted 
frauds largely relating to financial applications (for example for credit, loans or products 
purchased on contract or in instalments). It has over 250,000 records and 250+ member 
organisations.  
Experian National Fraud Database  
Contains fraud information relating to addresses, social security numbers, driving licences 
and phone numbers.  
National Insurance Fraud Register  
Launched in 2012 and contains information of individuals proven to have committed frauds 
against insurers.  
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